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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW—HOW IT GOT THERE
MATTERS: TRAIL SMELTER EVADES CERCLA
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AERIAL DEPOSITION OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE
Ryan K. Sullivan*
The Trail Smelter, operated by Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., is an
integrated smelting and refining complex in Trail, British Columbia.
It is situated approximately ten miles north of the United StatesCanadian border. In the early 1900s, the smelter was at the center of
an international lawsuit that led to a landmark decision of
international environmental law. Now, almost a century later, the
smelter, still in operation, is responsible for widespread
contamination on tribal lands located within Washington State. Once
again, the smelter is embroiled in a protracted legal battle, this time
facing liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
While Teck Cominco, which operates the Trail Smelter, suffered
several defeats throughout the legal proceedings, it recently scored a
significant victory. In 2016, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the
smelter operator, holding that emissions of hazardous waste do not
constitute “disposal” for the purposes of CERCLA liability. This
Note will argue that despite the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that it was
bound by prior precedent, there were important factual differences
that distinguished the Pakootas case from the preceding case law.
Furthermore, the decision in Pakootas is incongruous with CERCLA’s
legislative history and administrative enforcement. This Note will
argue that a definition of disposal that includes the aerial deposition
of hazardous waste is consistent with CERCLA’s statutory language
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and conducive to its broad, remedial purpose.

INTRODUCTION
Streaming out of Canada, the Columbia River makes its course into
the northeast corner of Washington State.1 The Upper Columbia River is
renowned for its fishing, particularly salmon, which make a yearly
anadromous journey upstream from the Pacific.2 This region is home to
the Colville Indian Reservation (established in 1872 by the federal
government),3 but, “since time immemorial,” indigenous tribes have
traditionally resided in this region and have relied on subsistence fishing
and hunting.4 The Columbia River forms an important cultural nexus
between the various tribes confederated under the Colville name
(Tribes).5
In the 1980s, concerns began to grow over the declining water
quality in the Columbia River. Environmental studies of the Columbia
River, its tributaries, and nearby Lake Roosevelt reported elevated
concentrations of arsenic, cadmium, lead, and zinc.6 Later, in 1992, the
1. Marion
E.
Marts,
Columbia
River,
ENCYC.
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Columbia-River
[https://perma.cc/RW79-GY68].
Prehistoric lava flows and glacial migration carved the Columbia River’s course. Id. In
northern Washington, these geological processes created a topography marked by steepedwalled ravines. Id. The largest of these ravines is Grand Coulee. Id.
2. Id. The area is also a popular tourism locale, which recently became an increasing
source of revenue for the tribal economy. Rich Landers, Fishing the Colville Indian
Reservation: More Fish, Less Competition, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (May 11, 2014),
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2014/may/11/fishing-the-colville-indian-reservation-morefish/#/0 [https://perma.cc/XHN9-4HLG].
3. Letter from Richard A. Du Bey, Special Envtl. Counsel to the Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Reservation, to Reg’l Adm’r U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Aug. 5, 1999) (on file
with EPA).
4. Id. The Tribes also derive considerable revenue from three casinos located on their
reservation. Treva Lind, Colvilles Get Back in Black, J. BUS. SPOKANE (July 14, 2011),
https://www.spokanejournal.com/local-news/colvilles-get-back-in-black/.
In 2010, Joe
Pakootas (the named plaintiff in the case that is the subject of this Note) was appointed CEO
of the company that manages these tribal casinos. Id.
5. See Susan Staiger Gooding, Place, Race, and Names: Layered Identities in United
States v. Oregon, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, Plaintiff-Intervenor, 28 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 1181, 1206–12 (1994). The Colville Reservation is comprised of eleven
different indigenous groups, each with their own distinct language and culture. Id. at 1206.
These tribes share a unique historical relationship with the region and the Columbia River,
gathering for an annual fishing ceremony during the yearly salmon runs. Id.
6. See A. Johnson et al., Transboundary Metal Pollution of the Columbia River
(Franklin D. Roosevelt Lake), 45 BULL. ENVTL. CONTAMINATION & TOXICOLOGY 703, 706
(1990). The concentrations of zinc, copper, and mercury were two orders of magnitude higher
than levels detected in nearby tributaries and waterways. Id. Lake Roosevelt is located in the
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U.S. Geological Survey found dioxins and furans in the Columbia
River’s sediment.7 In 1994, mercury concentrations found in sportfish
required Washington’s Department of Health to issue a consumption
advisory to the public.8
The source of the contamination was all too familiar to residents in
the region.9 A Canadian smelter, located just a few miles north of the
border, stands starkly against the surrounding bucolic valley.10 The
smelter is among the largest employers in Trail, British Columbia, and
provides vital economic support for the area; it also happens to boast an
infamous environmental résumé.11 At the turn of the twentieth century,
the smelter’s fumes led to an international environmental lawsuit
between the United States and Canada.12 Ultimately, the smelter
company was found responsible for transboundary pollution, but
succeeded in paying little compensation for its widespread
environmental harm.13
The same smelter—which a century earlier strangled crops and
livestock throughout the region—was now responsible for extensive
pollution within the Colville Reservation.14 The Tribes petitioned the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to investigate and determine

Columbia River Basin and provides irrigation for much of the surrounding agriculture. Marts,
supra note 1.
7. Du Bey, supra note 3, at para. 4.5.
8. Id. at para. 4.2. Along with mercury, the results demonstrated that fish were
consuming significant amounts of lead, cadmium, zinc, and other trace substances during their
annual spawning migrations. M. D. MUNN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T. OF INTERIOR, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CONCENTRATIONS OF MERCURY AND OTHER TRACE ELEMENTS IN
WALLEYE, SMALLMOUTH BASS, AND RAINBOW TROUT IN FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LAKE
AND THE UPPER COLUMBIA RIVER, WASHINGTON, 1994 21 tbl.10 (1995),
https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1995/0195/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MGC-P854].
9. See Johnson et al., supra note 6. “The high metals concentrations in Lake Roosevelt
sediments are thought to be primarily due to discharges from the Cominco Limited lead-zinc
smelter and refinery at Trail, BC, approximately ten miles above the international border.” Id.
at 708.
10. See George A. Shipman, The Columbia River Basin, 15 W. POL. Q. 34, 34–36
(Sept. 1962).
11. See generally Trail Operations, TECK, https://www.teck.com/operations/canada/
operations/trail-operations-5672/ [https://perma.cc/SCM7-NVGK]; see also John D. Wirth,
The Trail Smelter Dispute: Canadians and Americans Confront Transboundary Pollution,
1927–41, 1 ENVTL. HIST. 34 (1996).
12. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1908, 1917–19 (Apr. 1938),
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JHB-SSVA].
13. Id. at 1931.
14. See Toby Kruger, Trail Smelter II: A Prudent Approach? From Extraterritoriality
to Non-Discrimination, 43 U.B.C. L. REV. 109, 109–10 (2010) (“The amount of pollution
released by the smelter is, by all accounts, staggering.”).
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the extent of the contamination.15 The results were alarming to say the
least.16 The site was quickly placed on the National Priorities List
(NPL), which is comprised of contaminated locations in need of
emergency environmental remediation.17 The EPA also verified that the
Trail Smelter was the primary source of the hazardous waste
contaminating the Columbia River and, thus, responsible for the cleanup
costs
under
the
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).18
The operator of the Trail Smelter is Teck Cominco, a Canadian
company.19 Teck argued that it was not responsible for the cleanup costs
because, as a foreign corporation, it was not subject to the provisions of
CERCLA.20 Teck Cominco did not deny, however, that it had been
dumping hazardous waste into the Columbia River for almost a
century.21 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was not receptive to Teck
Cominco’s jurisdictional defense.22 The court found CERCLA could be
enforced against the company because the “release” of the hazardous
waste occurred within the domestic border of the United States.23
Along with dumping toxic metals into the Columbia River, Teck
Cominco was allegedly contaminating the area through aerial deposition
of particulate matter.24 The Tribes claimed that the smelter’s emissions
contained small particles of hazardous waste (e.g., mercury, lead,
cadmium, etc.); these particles are carried by wind currents and

15. Letter from Colleen Cawston, Chair, Colville Bus. Council, to Reg’l Adm’r U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency (July 30, 1999) (on file with EPA); Du Bey, supra note 3.
16. Upper Columbia River Site, No. CERCLA-10-2004-0018, at 2–3 (EPA Dec. 11,
2003), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/10/1167995.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALZ4-WTTY].
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2012).
18. Upper Columbia River Site, CERCLA-10-2004-0018 at 3–6.
19. See Trail Operations, supra note 11. The Trail Smelter has changed hands a
number of times during its operation: first it was owned by “Consolidated Mining and
Smelting Company of Canada Limited (CM&S), later Cominco Ltd., and now Teck Cominco
Metals Ltd., a subsidiary of Teck Cominco Limited.” Richard Fish, Trail Operations at 100,
CANADIAN MINING J. (June 1, 2006), http://www.canadianminingjournal.com/features/trailoperations-at-100/ [https://perma.cc/4VHF-P7RM].
20. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006).
21. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 979 n.2 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“Teck stipulated that it had dumped slag into the Columbia River in Canada, that some of the
slag came to be located in the United States, where it has leached and continues to leach
hazardous substances into the water and sediment of the Columbia River and Lake
Roosevelt . . . .”).
22. Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1079.
23. Id.
24. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 979.
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deposited throughout the Colville Reservation.25 Over time, this
continuous process results in high levels of soil contamination that
present serious long-term consequences for the environment.26
Teck Cominco challenged the legal sufficiency of the Tribes’ claim.
It argued that the aerial deposition of particulate matter did not constitute
“disposal” for the purposes of CERCLA.27 The issue was litigated
extensively and, ultimately, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Teck Cominco
that aerial deposition of hazardous waste is not a form of disposal under
CERCLA.28 Accordingly, Teck Cominco was not legally responsible for
the particulate matter contamination located on the Colville
Reservation.29 While the Tribes could still proceed with their other
claims against the company, this ruling dramatically curtailed the scope
of potential CERCLA liability in the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.30
First, this Note will explore the history of the Trail Smelter, and the
contamination that it has caused in Washington State. Next, it will
discuss the modern legal issues presented by the Trail Smelter’s
contamination of the Colville Reservation. To fully understand the
context of these legal issues, this Note will examine the history and
purpose of CERCLA, which is at the heart of the Pakootas case. Then,
this Note will explain the basis of the Pakootas court’s ruling, and will
argue that the decision was incorrect on several grounds.
As will be explained in the Analysis section of this Note, the court
failed to consider the factual context of the cases that were viewed as
binding and persuasive precedent. Further, the legislative history and
administrative enforcement of CERCLA supports the conclusion that the
aerial deposition of hazardous waste is a form of disposal. Accordingly,
the Pakootas court should have found that Teck Cominco was legally

25. Id.
26. In one scientific study, researchers found that contaminated soil caused plants to
grow slower, produce lower yields, and experience elevated toxicity symptoms like chlorosis
and necrosis. Michael Komárek et al., Bioavailability of Lead and Cadmium in Soils
Artificially Contaminated with Smelter Fly Ash, 83 BULL. ENVTL. CONTAMINATION &
TOXICOLOGY 286, 287–89 (2009).
27. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 980.
28. Id. at 986.
29. See id.
30. See id.; Environmental Law—Particulate Matter Emissions—Ninth Circuit Holds
That the Emission of Pollutants from Rail Yards Is Not “Disposal” of Solid Waste Under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.—Center for Community Action & Environmental
Justice v. BNSF Railway Co., 764 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1275
(2015) [hereinafter Particulate Matter Emissions] (“[I]f applied strictly, [this ruling] may
exempt from citizen suits some disposals of solid substances through the air . . . even though
they contribute to hazardous waste contamination of land or water.”).
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responsible for the emitted waste that subsequently contaminated the
Colville Reservation.
I.

HISTORY OF THE TRAIL SMELTER AND ITS LEGAL BATTLE
WITH THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE
RESERVATION

This section examines the history of the Trail Smelter dating back to
its original construction at the turn of the twentieth century and its
involvement in a legal battle between the United States and Canada.
Next, this section traces the facts that led to the recent Ninth Circuit
decision and discusses the legal arguments that were presented by both
sides. Lastly, this section provides a brief synopsis of CERCLA,
including its purpose and application, and how the law differs from
similar remedial statutes.
A. How It All Started: Smoke from the North
When silver ore was discovered in British Columbia in 1889, “[t]he
nearest smelter was . . . 500 miles away in Montana.”31 Noticing a
business opportunity, an engineer named E.S. Topping purchased a
silver mine and constructed a smelter in Trail, British Columbia.32 The
operations at Trail quickly expanded, and in 1906 the Consolidated
Mining and Smelting Company of Canada, Limited (Consolidated)
acquired the facility.33 Although the silver mines eventually stopped
production in the 1920s, zinc and lead ore discovered in the neighboring

31. Keith A. Murray, The Trail Smelter Case: International Air Pollution in the
Columbia Valley, 15 BC STUD. 68, 68 (1972). Smelting is “to melt or fuse (as ore)” in order
to change the chemical composition of the material and separate the metal. Smelt, MERRIAMWEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). Ironically, the nearest smelter was in
the unincorporated community of Black Eagle, which is now a recognized superfund site
itself. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Proposes Adding Anaconda Copper Mining
Co. Smelter and Refinery to Superfund Site List (Mar. 4, 2010), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/documents/PressRelease4Mar2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/QCY6-LT4M]. In
fact, the contamination and CERCLA enforcement action taken against the Black Eagle
smelter was cited in the Pakootas plaintiffs’ Rule 28(j) letter to the Ninth Circuit. See infra
Subpart II.C.
32. Murray, supra note 31, at 69.
33. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1908, 1917–19 (Apr. 1938),
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JHB-SSVA].
The
Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada, Ltd. had recently received its charter
from the Canadian government. Id. at 1917. Shortly thereafter, the corporation sold half of its
stock to the Canadian Pacific Railway, which immediately began construction of a spur line to
Trail. Murray, supra note 31, at 70.
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town of Kimberly intensified the operation at Trail.34 In 1925 and 1927,
two smoke stacks were erected at the Trail Smelter (both standing at 409
feet in height).35 The stacks were designed to disperse the smelter fumes
away from Trail, but neighboring mountains funneled the fumes south
toward the United States.36
Farmers in Stevens County, Washington, watched “[t]heir crops
wither[] and their cattle sicken[]” amidst the miasma.37 Desperate, they
sought any relief available. While some farmers entered into settlements
with Consolidated, others banded together and petitioned the local and
federal governments for assistance.38 After diplomatic discussion, the
United States and Canada agreed to have the International Joint
Commission (IJC) review the matter.39 The IJC’s official report
concluded that Consolidated was responsible for the environmental
issues in Stevens County, but only awarded $350,000 in total damages.40
Neither the United States nor Canada found this figure acceptable.41 The
case remained mired in international politics for several years until, in
1935, both countries signed the Ottawa Convention, thereby creating a
special tribunal to arbitrate the issue.42

34. Murray, supra note 31, at 71–72.
35. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A at 1917. The design of the stacks evidences an
intention to disperse hazardous waste over great distances. Infra Section II.A.2.
36. Murray, supra note 31, at 72–73; Wirth, supra note 11, at 35 (“Prevailing air
currents caused a marked increase in diurnal downdrafts, which scorched crops, accelerated
forest loss, and filled the Columbia River Valley below with choking, noxious fumes.”).
37. Murray, supra note 31, at 73.
38. Wirth, supra note 11, at 35. At the time, the Washington Constitution prohibited
any foreign person from holding interest in land; this prevented the Trail Smelter from
purchasing “smoke easements,” in an effort to settle claims with the local farmers. Id. at 35.
The farmers in Stevens County could not bring their claims in Canadian courts because
trespass on foreign land was non-justiciable in the common law courts. See British S. Afr. Co.
v. Companhia De Moçambique [1893] AC 602 (Eng. & Wales), 604, http://www.uniset.ca/
other/cs6/1893AC602.html. “Hence it was because of this domestic legal limitation
that . . . pollution by a private company affecting individuals was elevated to an international
dispute.” TIM STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 127
(2009).
39. Murray, supra note 31, at 75. The IJC was created in 1909 through the Boundary
Waters Treaty between the United States and Canada, which was drafted to address all issues
“involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to the
inhabitants of the other, along their common frontier, and to make provision for the
adjustment and settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise.” Treaty Between the
United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters between the United States and
Canada, Gr. Brit.-U.S., Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. 548.
40. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1918–19.
41. See id.; Murray, supra note 31, at 76–77. The claimants had sought more than
three times the awarded sum. Murray, supra note 31, at 76–77.
42. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1907.
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The tribunal ultimately ruled in favor of the farmers, but again the
total damages awarded were small.43 Conversely, Consolidated escaped
with its business and reputation unscathed.44 In fact, based on evidence
it presented during the proceedings, Consolidated was commended for
implementing a progressive mitigation strategy at Trail.45 However, the
tribunal did issue a valuable precedent that cautioned states against
permitting unbridled pollution within their borders.46 While this
decision was not revolutionary, it did underscore a fundamental ideology
that is now codified in many environmental regulatory models.47

43. Id. at 1931 (awarding the United States $78,000). The United States advocated that
while there was a conspicuous lack of visible destruction directly attributable to the smelter
fumes, research revealed bioaccumulation in plants, “which in some cases results in
destruction.” Wirth, supra note 11, at 44. The tribunal was not receptive to this “invisible
injury” theory and consequently awarded damages only for the harm that was evidently
quantifiable. Id. at 45. But see William K. Stevens, The Forest That Stopped Growing: Trail
is Traced to Acid Rain, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/16/
science/the-forest-that-stopped-growing-trail-is-traced-to-acid-rain.html (finding that sulfur
dioxide emitted from power plants leaches nutrients away from the soil and dramatically
affects the growth rates of neighboring forests).
44. Wirth, supra note 11, at 37. In fact, the tribunal did not consider the impact on the
environment itself; this is perhaps most indicative of the “limited environmental
consciousness of the time,” which could only quantify damages in terms of real economic
loss. STEPHENS, supra note 38, at 135.
45. Wirth, supra note 11, at 37. In the years following the decision, Consolidated
claimed that it removed more sulfur dioxide from its emissions than all other smelters in North
America combined. Murray, supra note 31, at 84.
46. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965.
The Tribunal, therefore, finds that the above decisions, taken as a whole, constitute
an adequate basis for its conclusions, namely, that, under the principles of
international law, as well as of the law of the United States, no State has the right
to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by
fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.
Id.; see also Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907) (finding that it was
reasonable for a state to enjoin a foreign business for transboundary pollution). The facts
underlying Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. were quite similar to the issues confronted in
Washington. See Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238. The Ducktown Basin in Georgia was
located between a series of Appalachian Mountains, the topographic dynamics caused smoke
from the Tennessee copper smelter to stagnate over the town “in a highly concentrated state,
causing damage too severe and too pervasive for Georgia authorities to ignore.” DUNCAN
MAYSILLES, DUCKTOWN SMOKE: THE FIGHT OVER ONE OF THE SOUTH’S GREATEST
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS 102 (2011).
47. See JAMES BARROS & DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
POLLUTION 75 (1974). Some argue that the Trail Smelter case advocates for strict liability
against the polluter (a key concept within CERCLA, see infra Subpart I.C), while others
contend it only invokes the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (“use your
property in such a manner as not to injure that of another”). Id. Regardless of this academic
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B. The Modern Trail Smelter Dilemma
Over the next several decades, the owners of the Trail Smelter
expanded their operations. Soon, it was among the largest lead-zinc
smelters in the world.48 But, this rapid expansion was not without
environmental consequences.49 In 1999, the Tribes living on sovereign
territory in Washington state petitioned the EPA to conduct a
preliminary assessment of their land.50 The Tribes were concerned that
the neighboring Trail Smelter was, once again, contaminating the
region.51 The EPA’s preliminary study found heavy metals, including
“arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, mercury and zinc,” in addition to slag
(a known smelting byproduct) throughout the assessment zone.52 The
EPA concluded that the site was eligible for the NPL and ordered Teck
Cominco, the current owner of the Trail Smelter, to conduct a Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS).53
debate, the decision’s principles were incorporated into the Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment: a landmark document that recognized the intrinsic need for more
international environmental regulation. See id. at 299–303; see also Martijn van de Kerkhof,
The Trail Smelter Case Re-examined: Examining the Development of National Procedural
Mechanisms to Resolve a Trail Smelter Type Dispute, 27 MERKOURIOS-UTRECHT J. INT’L &
EUR. L. 68, 74 (2011); cf. CAROLYN ABBOT, ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL
REGULATION, STRENGTHENING SANCTION AND IMPROVING DETERRENCE 43 (2009) (noting
that strict legal consequences can bring about dramatic changes in “corporate policy and
management”).
48. See Trail Operations, supra note 11.
49. See generally Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir.
2006); see also Upper Columbia River Site, No. CERCLA-10-2004-0018, (EPA Dec. 11,
2003), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/10/1167995.pdf [https://perma.cc/ALZ4-WTTY].
50. See Cawston, supra note 15; Du Bey, supra note 3. The petition stated that the
Upper Columbia River Basin was of “central importance to the Colville Tribes’ subsistence
and culture.” Du Bey, supra note 3, at para. 2. Evidence of water and soil contamination,
along with bioaccumulation in wildlife, presented a discernable risk to the health and wellbeing of local residents and tourists. See Cawston, supra note 15.
51. See Cawston, supra note 15; see also Du Bey, supra note 3.
52. Upper Columbia River Site, CERCLA-10-2004-0018 at 2 para. 4. Carcinogenic
contaminants in the soil and groundwater of an assessment site typically result in a high score
on the Hazard Ranking System (HRS) index, which is a “quick-and-dirty estimate of the
potential for exposure to hazardous substances.” Shreekant Gupta et al., Do Benefits and
Costs Matter in Environmental Regulation? An Analysis of EPA Decisions Under Superfund,
in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 91 (Richard L. Revesz &
Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995).
53. Upper Columbia River Site, CERCLA-10-2004-0018 at 9 para. 4. The NPL is
comprised of sites with the highest HRS scores; these sites are eligible for long-term remedial
action from the CERCLA trust fund. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(g)(2) (2016). The RI/FS is a vital
stage in the cleanup process; it is a detailed study that outlines a site’s overall risk to the
community and presents a plan for remediation. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (2011); James T.
Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi, The Magnitude and Policy Implications of Health Risk from
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Teck Cominco never fulfilled its obligation to perform the RI/FS,
nor did the EPA attempt to enforce its order.54 The matter might have
ended there but the Tribes brought a private action against Teck
Cominco under 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1).55 The Tribes’ complaint was
predicated on the EPA’s preliminary findings, alleging that Teck
Cominco was responsible for cleanup costs at the Upper Columbia River
(UCR) site based on CERCLA “arranger” liability.56
Originally, the Pakootas case focused only on Teck Cominco’s
disposal of hazardous waste directly into the Columbia River.57 During
the proceedings, however, the Tribes amended their complaint to include
allegations that the smelter’s emissions had caused contamination at the
UCR site.58 In response, Teck Cominco filed a motion to strike, arguing
that “CERCLA imposes no liability when hazardous substances travel
through the air and then ‘into or on any land or water.’”59 The district
court denied the defendant’s motions to strike and to reconsider, but the
matter was certified for interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of

Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE, AND LAW 91
(Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995).
54. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006).
55. Id. The Tribes also sought “penalties for [Teck Cominco’s] noncompliance and
recovery for costs and fees.” Id. Section 9659(a)(1) permits a private action to enforce an
administrative order. 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(1) (2016). At the time the action was initiated,
Joseph Pakootas was the CEO of the Confederate Tribes of the Colville Reservation; he ran
for Congress as a Democrat in 2016. See generally Pakootas for Congress, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/pakootasforcongress/ [https://perma.cc/R2N4-GF2S].
56. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d
975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. CV-04-256), at 10 para. 8.5; see infra Subpart II.C. There are four
ways that a party can be liable under CERCLA, one of which is as an “arranger.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(3) (2016). Under this classification, if a party arranges for the disposal of
hazardous waste, it can be liable for any damage caused by the arranged disposal. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(3) (2016); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602
(2008).
See generally Daniel J. DePasquale, Note, Environmental Law—CERCLA
Enforcement: Terminology and Meaning of “Treatment” Arranger Liability, 38 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 425 (2016) (analyzing CERCLA arranger liability for contamination caused by
“treatment” of a hazardous waste). Arrangement is a nebulous concept that has been analyzed
in numerous cases, and a full discussion of arranger liability exceeds the narrow scope of this
Note.
57. See Pakootas, 452 F.3d at 1069–70. Teck Cominco eventually admitted that
between 1906 and 1995, it annually dumped more than 145,000 tons of industrial waste
directly into the Columbia River. Id. at 1069–70. The river pathway claims have proceeded
separately from the claims alleging aerial deposition of hazardous waste. Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016).
58. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 979.
59. Id. at 980.
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Appeals.60 The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling.61
The court of appeals’ decision was based on two prior cases that
specifically addressed the term “disposal” for the purposes of
environmental liability.62 The first, and perhaps more influential case,
Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF
Railyard Co., was a 2014 opinion regarding diesel emissions at rail
yards.63 This case introduced a controversial “order-of-disposal” rule
that seemingly required hazardous waste to first be physically placed on
the ground before any emissions thereof could constitute disposal.64 The
Pakootas ruling was also guided by a prior en banc opinion, Carson
Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., that addressed the scope of
CERCLA liability when applied to the passive migration of
contaminates through soil and other media.65
Together these two cases (BNSF and Carson Harbor) form the vital
legal basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pakootas.66 But, in
reaching its decision, the court ignored factual and legal issues that
distinguished the Pakootas claim from those presented in the case law.
As this Note will argue, this error led to a decision that is incongruous
with CERCLA’s purpose, legislative history, and prior administrative
application.
C. CERCLA’s Origins and Legislative History
To understand the Ninth Circuit’s decision, it is necessary to
understand CERCLA liability. CERCLA was enacted in response to a
community health crisis in Niagara Falls, New York, that garnered
national media attention and collective public outcry.67 But, as
60. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 7408399,
at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014), rev’d, 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016).
61. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 986.
62. See id. at 983–84.
63. See generally Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d
1019 (9th Cir. 2014). It should be noted that BNSF involved the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) and not CERCLA, but disposal has the same meaning under both laws.
Id. at 1020; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2016).
64. See Particulate Matter Emissions, supra note 30, at 1274–75.
65. See generally Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir.
2001) (en banc).
66. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 983–84.
67. ROGER C. HERDMAN ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL: PUBLIC HEALTH
TIME BOMB 3 (Sept. 1978), https://www.health.ny.gov/environmental/investigations/
love_canal/lctimbmb.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP7B-YMT6].
Over a thirty-year period,
“[c]hemicals of unknown kind and quantity were buried at the site.” Id. “After 1953, the site
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lawmakers investigated the issue, they discovered the problems
confronted in Niagara Falls were also occurring throughout the United
States.68 Congress wanted a law that would enable the government to
respond swiftly to locations in need of dire assistance and pass the
cleanup costs onto the responsible party.69
Unfortunately, when it came to drafting CERCLA, political conflict
hampered the legislative process.70 The bill that would eventually
become CERCLA was originally introduced in the House as the
“Hazardous Waste Containment Act” and was designed to address “oil
or other pollution of navigable waters.”71 Contemporaneously, Senator
Edmund Muskie (D-ME) introduced Senate bill 1480, which contained
many provisions that are fundamental to CERCLA today.72 However,
both bills encountered difficulties in their respective legislative bodies.73
Concerned that a change in the political balance of Congress might
doom the endeavor entirely, a compromise bill was introduced in the
Senate and rushed through the House during a lame-duck session in
1980.74 Unsurprisingly, the final draft was written haphazardly and
many key provisions were defined by cross-reference to existing laws.75

was covered with earth.” Id. Ignorant to the danger below, a school and neighborhood were
built on the vacant land. Id. In the 1970s, residents noticed strange odor emanating through
their basement floors. Id. Later identified as toxic chemicals, these substances were found to
cause serious harm, including miscarriages, birth defects, and liver damage. Id. at 12.
68. S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 7–8 (1980) (the report documents instances that preceded
the Love Canal incident, including cases of widespread contamination in Michigan, Virginia,
and elsewhere in New York). “Not only are water supplies being contaminated, but untold
numbers of innocent persons are exposed to extremely toxic and hazardous chemicals. Some
places, such as Love Canal, have become environmental ghettos.” Id. at 10.
69. 126 CONG. REC. 26,334, 26,339 (Sept. 19, 1980) (statement of Rep. Staggers)
(“Existing law . . . does not authorize cleanup action or provide for an assured source of
funding for such action if persons responsible for the hazard cannot be located, are insolvent,
or refuse to take remedial action.”).
70. A full examination of CERCLA’s legislative history exceeds the scope of this Note.
For a more detailed discussion, see generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of
1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
71. Id. at 4. Pursuant to the “[United States] Constitution, bills that establish taxes or
address revenue” must have their origins in the House. CAROLYN STERN SWITZER & PETER
GRAY, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABILITY ACT (SUPERFUND) 8 (2d ed. 2002).
72. See Grad, supra note 70, at 6–8. In particular, the law enabled the government to
take quick action on contaminated sites and recover the costs later. Id. at 8.
73. ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE 1–8 (2006
ed.).
74. See id.
75. SWITZER & GRAY, supra note 71, at 5–8.
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This method of defining by cross-reference to another law is not
uncommon, but occasionally presents problems during future statutory
interpretation—as this Note will soon explore.76
1. Liability Under CERCLA and the Definition of “Disposal”
There are four ways that a party can be liable for cleanup costs
under CERCLA. For the purposes of this Note, the focus will be on
§ 9607(a)(3):
[A]ny person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances.77

Based on this statutory language, if a party has arranged for the
disposal of a hazardous substance, it can be potentially liable under
CERCLA for any harm caused by the arranged disposal.78
CERCLA does not define “disposal” for its own purposes.79 Rather,
the term is defined according to § 6903 of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA).80 RCRA was enacted two years before
CERCLA.81 Whereas CERCLA is a remediation statute that is
“designed to impose liability for past conduct with present effects,”82
RCRA is intended “to reduce the generation of hazardous waste and to
ensure the proper treatment, storage, and disposal of [that] waste which
is nonetheless generated.”83 Based on RCRA and CERCLA’s divergent

76. Infra Subpart II.C.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2016).
78. Id. See generally Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599,
602 (2009). Prior to Santa Fe Railway, the Ninth Circuit found Teck Cominco to be an
“arranger,” even though it did not contract with a third-party to dispose of its hazardous waste.
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006). “We hesitate to
endorse a statutory interpretation that would leave a gaping and illogical hole in the statute’s
coverage, permitting argument that generators of hazardous waste might freely dispose of it
themselves and stay outside the statute’s cleanup liability provisions.” Id.
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(v)(29) (2016).
80. Id.
81. JOHN S. APPLEGATE & JAN G. LAITOS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: RCRA, CERCLA,
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE 129 (2006).
82. Id. RCRA is a regulatory statute that adopts a “cradle-to-grave” strategy for
controlling the production and, ultimately, disposal of hazardous waste. Id. at 18–19.
83. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996). Pursuant to RCRA, a
hazardous waste must be a “solid waste.” 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (2016).
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goals, the definition of disposal should not be applied uniformly to the
separate statutes.84 Nevertheless, interpretations of disposal for the
purposes of RCRA are considered influential in CERCLA cases.85
Section 6903 defines disposal as “the discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous
waste into or on any land or water.”86 While this definition is relatively
self-explanatory, not all conduct fits neatly within the provided terms.87
Consequently, as was the case in Pakootas, courts are often tasked with
parsing the statutory language for answers.88 Naturally, this form of
judicial inquiry is ripe for controversy, regardless of the outcome.89
D. The Pakootas Court’s Interpretation of Disposal
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Pakootas (2016) is remarkably short
considering the vast implications of the decision. The court essentially
defers to the legal analysis provided in two Ninth Circuit opinions:
BNSF90 and Carson Harbor.91 While these cases were certainly relevant
to deciding the merits of the Pakootas claim, they were not necessarily
dispositive.92 Nevertheless, the court seemingly declared Pakootas dead
on arrival, without ever checking for a pulse.
1.

BNSF’s Holding and Its Relevance to Pakootas

In BNSF, the plaintiffs brought suit under RCRA, claiming that
diesel particulate matter (DPM) emitted from rail yards presented “an
imminent and substantial endangerment” to citizens throughout

84. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL
7408399, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014), rev’d, 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016).
85. See Pakootas, 830 F.3d, at 983–86.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2016).
87. See, e.g., ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997)
(finding that the passive migration of chemicals, which a prior landowner spilled, did not
constitute disposal under CERCLA or RCRA).
88. See, e.g., Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 876–87 (9th Cir.
2001) (en banc).
89. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 73, at 580 (“[T]hough the liability scheme is strict,
[Potentially Responsible Parties] are left with plenty of room to argue that some aspect of their
activities related to the sites . . . do not fit within the defined categories, and thus that they are
not liable under the statute.”).
90. Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th
Cir. 2014).
91. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 876–87.
92. See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1021 (analyzing the definition of disposal for the purposes
of RCRA); see also Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 876–87 (holding that disposal does not
include the passive migration of contaminates under CERCLA).
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California.93
The complaint was brought by a group of local
environmental advocates who argued that over 1.8 million residents in
the San Bernardino valley faced an increased risk of cancer due to the
rail yard emissions.94 Invoking RCRA, the plaintiffs argued that DPM
was released from idling locomotives and dispersed throughout the
surrounding environment.95 Thereafter, the DPM was swept up and “reentrained into the air by wind, air currents and passing vehicles,” and
inhaled.96
The Ninth Circuit dismissed the case on appeal. The court found
that the plaintiffs’ case was not cognizable under RCRA because the
DPM was emitted prior to its contact with the ground.97 The court’s
decision was based on its analysis of the terms that comprise the
definition of “disposal.”98 The court found it particularly informative
that the definition of “release”99 for the purpose of RCRA included the
term “emitting,” whereas the definition of “disposal” did not.100 The
court interpreted this omission as evidence that Congress must have
intended to exclude emissions from the definition of disposal.101
93. BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1021 (Researchers in California found that DPM “caus[ed]
cancer and other adverse health problems, including respiratory illnesses and increased risk of
heart disease.”). Id.
94. Id. Center for Community Action and Environmental Justice (CCAEJ) is a
grassroots organization in California. See About Us, CTR. FOR CMTY. ACTION & ENVTL.
JUST., http://ccaej.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/GR3P-WBF7]. Its overall mission is to
address local environmental issues, particularly in areas of poverty where abuses are more
prevalent and attract less public attention. Id.
95. See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1021.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1025. This has been called the “order-of-disposal rule.” Particulate Matter
Emissions, supra note 30, at 1276. Under BNSF’s holding, once a hazardous waste is
“aerosolized” and emitted, any subsequent contamination or harm from that waste is not
subject to a RCRA claim. See id. at 1276–77.
98. BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024 (“By its terms, ‘disposal’ includes only conduct that results
in the placement of solid waste ‘into or on any land or water.’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3))
(2016). Intriguingly, when attempting to distinguish a Tenth Circuit decision that found an
aerosolized mist of hexavalent chromium was a form of disposal under RCRA, the BNSF
court concluded that this technically did not constitute disposal through the air, because the
mist was sprayed directly on the land. Id. at 1025; see United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 191
F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999).
99. A release, in the context of arranger liability, occurs once the hazardous waste has
already been disposed. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th
Cir. 2006). For the purposes of CERCLA, there must be a release, or threatened release, of
hazardous waste in order to impose liability on a PRP. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2016).
100. BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024.
101. See id. at 1024–25 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 452
(2002)) (“[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
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The plaintiffs argued, however, that obviating liability in this
circumstance would run counter to congressional intent because it would
create an inconceivable regulatory gap between RCRA and the Clean Air
Act (CAA), through which rail yards could pollute with impunity. 102
The court demurred, and dismissed any potential regulatory gap as an
intended exception.103 Needless to say, the BNSF claim failed because
the plaintiffs were unable to convince the court that RCRA was a valid
means of addressing what was, essentially, an air quality issue.104
Intriguingly, the Pakootas plaintiffs do not challenge the BNSF
holding, but rather contend it is inapplicable to the merits of their
claim.105 Unlike BNSF, the Pakootas case addresses a specific parcel of
land that suffered quantifiable harm as a result of the defendant’s
industrial practices.106 The parties were not making an air quality claim;
the law was not being expanded beyond its intended purpose.107 While
this thesis might have convinced the court to rule in the plaintiffs’ favor,
the Ninth Circuit also found other concerns that ostensibly supported
dismissal of the claim.108
2. Whether Emissions Constitute a Passive Migration of
Contaminates
Carson Harbor is a landmark Ninth Circuit case involving the
leaching of toxic waste through soil stratifications and whether such
passive migration constitutes disposal for the purposes of CERCLA. 109
Contamination is commonly not an acute event—for example, Teck
Cominco contaminated the Columbia River over the course of several
decades before any legal action was finally taken.110 While imposing
liability on direct contamination—like dumping toxic waste into a

in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”).
102. See id. at 1029–30.
103. Id. at 1026–29 (discussing legislative developments with regard to RCRA and the
CAA).
104. Id. at 1029–30.
105. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 2016).
106. See id. at 978–80. For a detailed discussion of the harm suffered, see Cawston,
supra note 15.
107. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL
7408399, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2014), rev’d, 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016).
108. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 983–86.
109. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 868–70 (9th Cir. 2001)
(en banc).
110. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1069–72 (9th Cir. 2006).
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river—is intuitive, when a natural environmental process spreads the
contamination, the courts have been more reluctant to attach
responsibility to the polluter.111
In Carson Harbor, a mobile home park was built on land formerly
used for petroleum production.112 During a financing reappraisal, toxic
slag was discovered on the trailer park premises.113 The contamination
required extensive cleanup and remediation.114 In an attempt to recoup
their costs, the proprietor brought suit against prior owners of the land,
alleging inter alia that they were responsible for cleanup costs under
CERCLA.115 The court found that the claims against Unocal (the
petroleum producer) might be cognizable under CERCLA; however, the
plaintiff’s allegations against a general partnership—which owned the
land after Unocal and sold it to the current tenants—presented a thornier
legal issue.116
The partnership’s argument was simple: it was not liable under
CERCLA because it did not dispose of any hazardous waste during its
ownership.117 The plaintiff posited that under CERCLA’s seemingly
expansive definition of disposal, the partnership fit the requirements for
a Potentially Responsible Party (PRP). The plaintiff asserted that
because the toxic slag continued to spread through the soil while the
partnership owned the land, the defendant had technically committed
disposal as defined by CERCLA.118 In weighing decisions from several
federal jurisdictions and analyzing CERCLA’s statutory language, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that this natural permeation was not a form of
disposal under the law.119 Otherwise, disposal could become a neverending process of passive proliferation that imputes liability against all
prior landowners, regardless of the contaminant’s latency.120

111. See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 877–78; Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. Acme, Inc., 264
F.3d 692, 697 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding disposal requires active human conduct); ABB Indus.
Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 358–59 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the gradual
spread of contaminates through the ground did not constitute disposal). But see Nurad, Inc. v.
William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding contaminates leaking
out of discarded drums does constitute disposal for the purposes of CERCLA).
112. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 868.
113. Id. at 868–69.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 869.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 875–84.
120. See id. The court was also concerned that creating liability in this circumstance
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In applying this reasoning, the Pakootas court found that aerial
disposal of hazardous waste presented the same issue as passive soil
migration: as a natural geological process, there was no discernable point
at which the disposal could have stopped.121 In the court’s view, to
extend liability in this context would implicitly disagree with a central
tenet of Carson Harbor.122 As a three-judge panel cannot overrule an en
banc decision, the Pakootas court was resigned to follow precedent on
this issue.123
II.
THE PAKOOTAS COURT WAS NOT BOUND BY PRECEDENT AND
IT FAILED TO CONSIDER CERCLA’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
The argument section of this Note first analyzes the distinguishable
factors between the Pakootas case and the decisions the Ninth Circuit
cited as binding precedent. Second, this section contends that the
remedial purpose behind CERCLA supports a broader interpretation of
the term “disposal.” Finally, this section concludes by arguing that the
legislative history and administrative enforcement of CERCLA
buttresses the Tribes’ position that liability can be imposed on PRPs for
causing the aerial deposition of hazardous waste.
A. The Decisions in BNSF and Carson Harbor Are Distinguishable
from the Pakootas Case
The Pakootas court’s reliance on BNSF and Carson Harbor is
misplaced because these decisions should be analyzed within their
factual context.124 In this regard, the Pakootas court could have
concluded that the Trail Smelter’s emissions were a form of disposal,
without disrupting the holdings in either of the preceding cases.125 It is
could potentially undermine the viability of the “innocent landowner defense.” Id. at 883; see
infra Section III.A.2. Under the “innocent landowner defense,” a PRP can escape potential
CERCLA liability provided it can show that “the release of hazardous substances was caused
solely by ‘an act or omission of a third party.’” Id. at 871 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6907(b)(3)).
121. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 983 (9th Cir. 2016).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Cf. Little Hocking Water Ass’n, Inc., v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 91 F. Supp.
3d 940, 966 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (“[W]hen interpreting what constitutes land disposal of solid
waste under RCRA, the Court should proceed on a case-by-case basis”).
125. See Jordan Luebkemann, Trail to Perdition: The Ninth Circuit’s “Emission”
Omission Disposition, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 146, 166–73 (2016) (“Although the court is
correct to note the writing on its slate, a more careful examination of the earlier precedent
reveals that those decisions left the court with plenty of blank space in which to scribe a better
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evident from the Pakootas opinion and the court’s comments during oral
argument126 that the Ninth Circuit felt constrained by BNSF’s order of
disposal rule.127 However, the Pakootas court should have noted that the
plaintiffs in BNSF only brought suit under RCRA because the CAA was
inapplicable to rail yards.128 The parties were not claiming that DPM
was contaminating a specific parcel of land or body of water.129 Rather,
they were arguing that DPM was emitted from rail yards and directly
inhaled by the general populace.130 This is technically an air quality
claim within the purview of the CAA.131 Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit was understandably reluctant to recognize an unintended
legislative overlap between RCRA and the CAA.132
Conversely, the plaintiffs’ claim in Pakootas fits squarely within the
provisions of CERCLA.133
The salient fact in reaching this
determination is that the plaintiffs seek remediation of the environment,
specifically the soil and water within the UCR site.134 This is distinct
from the claims presented in BNSF, which focused on the human health
risks associated with inhaling ambient DPM.135 It would seem that
BNSF should only apply when the basis of the claim is the “emission” of
hazardous waste.136 However, if the emitted waste has been introduced
into the physical environment, and the “deposition” is the basis of the

opinion.”).
126. Oral Argument at 12:12–13:27, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d
975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35228), www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=
0000009390. Judge Callahan notes that the BNSF court did not need to establish the order of
disposal rule, nevertheless the case does require physical placement of hazardous waste onto
land or water in order to constitute disposal. Id. at 12:12–13:50; see infra Section III.A.1.
The court questioned counsel on whether a contrary ruling in Pakootas would require the
panel to classify the order of disposal rule as a statement of dicta. Oral Argument at 11:13–
11:40, Pakootas, 830 F.3d 975 (No. 15-35228).
127. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2016).
128. See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1022
(9th Cir. 2014).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1021.
131. Id. at 1021–22. However, locomotives are “indirect sources” of pollution under
the CAA and not subject to federal regulation. Id. at 1027.
132. See id. at 1030 (finding that the omission of DPM from the CAA “[was] the
product of a careful and reasoned decision made by Congress”).
133. See Brief for the United Sates, as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 8–10,
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35228).
134. See Response Brief for the Appellee State of Washington at 8–10, Pakootas v.
Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35228).
135. See Brief for the United States, supra note 133, at 12–16.
136. See id. at 14–15.
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claim, then the BNSF rule should be inconsequential.137
1. The BNSF Court’s “Order of Disposal” Statement Is Not a
Bright-Line Rule
The vast majority of arguments presented in Pakootas138 focused on
a single statement in the BNSF opinion: “[w]e therefore conclude that
‘disposal’ occurs where the solid waste is first placed ‘into or on any
land or water’ and is thereafter ‘emitted into the air.’”139 Teck’s
argument was that regardless of this statement’s logic, it nevertheless
creates a rule that emissions are not a form of disposal under
CERCLA.140 The Tribes argued that the rule in BNSF should be
interpreted as only addressing the ambient aspect of contamination; it
was not intended to address contamination that causes harm to the
physical environment.141
Teck’s argument interprets the “order of disposal” rule as presenting
a two-stage requirement for disposal: the hazardous waste must first be
placed “into or on any land or water,” then “emitted into the air.”142
However, Teck fails to explain how this rule operates for land
contaminated by subsequent emissions. If aerial pathway claims have no
merit according to BNSF, then the second stage in this rule is not just
superfluous, it is wrong.143 To follow this argument to its logical end, if
the subsequently emitted waste travels onto a neighboring parcel, the
contamination would not constitute “disposal” because the hazardous
waste was not directly placed on the locus in quo.144
Alternatively, if the BNSF statement is read as addressing only the
aerial aspect of the contamination, the subsequent emissions requirement
does not undermine the rule. In examining this concept further, it is
helpful to view it within BNSF’s factual context. In BNSF, the plaintiffs

137. See Ctr. for Cmty. Action & Envtl. Justice v. BNSF Ry. Co., 764 F.3d 1019, 1024
(9th Cir. 2014).
138. See Response Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 20–24; Brief for the
United States, supra note 133, at 18–20; Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 1:24–10:45.
139. BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024.
140. See Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 0:30–10:31; Particulate Matter Emissions,
supra note 30, at 1272.
141. See Response Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 20–24; see also Pakootas
v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., No. CV-04-256-LRS, 2014 WL 7408399, at *2 (E.D. Wash.
Dec. 31, 2014), rev’d and remanded, 830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding that disposal
should be examined in the context of the “facility” that it contaminates).
142. See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024; Oral Argument, supra note 126, at 1:24–1:45.
143. See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024.
144. See id.
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claimed that the defendant’s disposal was a three-stage process: (1) the
DPM was emitted from rail yards; (2) it fell to the ground; and (3) the
DPM was, subsequently, swept up by wind and air currents and inhaled
by humans.145 To succeed in their RCRA claim, the BNSF plaintiffs
were required to show that the defendant’s disposal “present[ed] ‘an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment.’”146 RCRA defines disposal as: “the discharge, deposit,
injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or
hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment
or be emitted into the air.”147 In BNSF, the “imminent and substantial
endangerment” was not the affect rail yard emissions had on the
environment, but rather the inhalation of ambient DPM.148 By its very
nature, such a claim is not consistent with the overall purpose of RCRA,
which is meant to address disposal and storage of hazardous waste.149
The Pakootas claim escapes this pitfall because it seeks remediation
of the UCR site—the medium of transport should be inconsequential to
the merits of the case.150 The court is not examining whether
“emissions” constitute disposal, but whether “deposition” of hazardous
waste falls within CERCLA’s definition. As advocated by the plaintiffs,
the Ninth Circuit should have examined the factual underpinnings of the
BNSF decision. In so doing, the court may have found that the issues

145. Id. at 1020–21.
146. Id. at 1020 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2018)).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2016) (emphasis added).
148. BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1020–21.
149. APPLEGATE & LAITOS, supra note 81.
150. See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024; Little Hocking Water Ass’n, Inc. v. E.I. du Pont
Nemours & Co., 91 F. Supp. 3d 940, 966 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (finding that RCRA could be
invoked to address aerial deposition of particulate matter when it causes soil and groundwater
contamination). In Little Hocking, the court declined to follow a narrow reading of RCRA
that would require a two-stage order of disposal; “solid C8 particles are emitted into the air,
fall onto the ground, remain there, and then contaminate the soil and groundwater . . . this type
of soil and groundwater contamination is precisely the type of harm RCRA aims to
remediate.” Id. at 965; cf. Citizens Against Pollution v. Ohio Power Co., No. C2-04-CV-371,
2006 WL 6870564, at *4–5 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2006) (finding that flue gas emissions could
be considered disposal under RCRA because there was evidence that the flue gas came into
physical contact with the ground). Curiously, the BNSF opinion also states (without
articulation) that the holding in United States v. Power Eng’g Co. is not contradictory to the
Ninth Circuit’s order of disposal rule. BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1025; see United States v. Power
Eng’g Co., 191 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the aerial spraying of
hexavalent chromium was disposal for the purposes of RCRA). Perhaps, the court found it
inapposite because there was “demonstrable contact” with the environment. See Response
Brief for the Appellee, supra note 134, at 20–24; Luebkemann, supra note 125, at 164.
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between the cases, while conceptually similar, were markedly
incomparable.151 In adopting the defendant’s argument, the court
declined to issue a more nuanced explication of the “order of disposal”
rule152—one that reconciled the logical inconsistencies of BNSF when
applied to cases like Pakootas.
2. Aerial Deposition of Hazardous Waste Is Consistent with
Carson Harbor’s Definition of Disposal
Even if the Pakootas plaintiffs had convinced the court to find the
BNSF decision inapposite, the Carson Harbor case presented an
additional hurdle. The court’s opinion makes it clear that it was
concerned that if CERCLA liability was determined to include the aerial
deposition of hazardous waste, disposal “would be a never-ending
process”—a concept inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in
Carson Harbor.153 However, the court’s conclusion is misguided
because the Carson Harbor decision chiefly focused on limiting disposal
to those modes that are provided within CERCLA’s definition (e.g.,
discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, etc.).154 Thus,
this explains the finding in Carson Harbor that the passive migration of
contaminates through subsurface soil was not disposal because such
“movement” was more aptly described as “‘seeping,’ ‘oozing,’ and
possibly ‘leaching.’”155 None of those terms are found in CERCLA’s
definition of disposal; consequently, the passive movement of
contaminates was not considered disposal pursuant to the statute’s
language.156
Conversely, “depositing” is a form of disposal according to
CERCLA.157 Furthermore, for decades, the term “depositing” has been

151. See Frank Cioffi, Filling Holes in the Air: Why the Ninth Circuit in Pakootas v.
Teck Cominco Should Decline to Open up a New Hole in Coverage That Would Circumvent
CERCLA Arranger Liability for Sites Contaminated by Aerial Emissions, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 28, 58–62 (2016) (arguing that the plaintiffs’ goal in BNSF was to “enjoin the
defendant’s pollution of the ambient air” and that the Pakootas case is factually dissimilar).
152. See BNSF, 764 F.3d at 1024.
153. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2016); see
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(finding that passive migration is a never ending geological process and it would be contrary
to CERCLA’s statutory language to extend liability in this regard).
154. See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 882–83; see also 42
U.S.C. § 6903 (2016).
155. See Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 879.
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903.
157. Id.
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synonymous with the aerial transfer of hazardous chemicals—“dry acid
deposition” or “dry deposition” is the means by which emitted waste
particles and particulate matter “precursors” come to be located in the
natural environment.158 Moreover, the innocent landowner issue that
influenced the Carson Harbor court should not be implicated in cases
involving the aerial deposition of hazardous waste. With this concern
addressed, there is no policy basis that vitiates the merits of the Pakootas
claim.159 Ultimately, the central tenet of Carson Harbor is not whether
an indeterminate geological process can constitute disposal, but whether
the process is consistent with the plain meaning of “disposal,” or any of
its provided terms.160
B. CERCLA Was Intended to Address the Aerial Deposition of
Hazardous Waste
The Ninth Circuit concluded that CERCLA’s legislative history was
unavailing in the Pakootas case “because Congress did not appear to
consider a fact pattern like this one.”161
Although the court
acknowledged that Congress did discuss emissions during the bill’s
passage, it was unclear if these statements were addressing the issue of
disposal.162 The court implicitly concedes, however, that if the
legislative history was clear it would be considered, especially given the
ambiguities in the statute’s language.163
Courts often deride CERCLA for being an abomination of linguistic
construction.164 In part, the blame falls upon the final draft that was the
158. See CAN.–U.S. AIR QUALITY COMM., CANADA–UNITED STATES
TRANSBOUNDARY PARTICULATE MATTER SCIENCE ASSESSMENT 4–7 (Dec. 2004),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-07/documents/canadau.s._transboundary_pm_science_assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS88-MAZJ]; see also
Stevens, supra note 43.
159. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 878–80; see Oral Argument, supra note 126, at
28:29–28:50.
160. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 887.
161. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 2016).
162. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985. CERCLA’s definition of release includes the term
“emitting.” See 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2016). As mentioned above, one of the requirements for
prevailing in a private action under CERCLA liability is to demonstrate that a hazardous
substance has been “released,” from the contaminated site. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 981. The
definition of release is broader than the definition of disposal. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601,
with 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (2016).
163. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985 (citing Tides v. Boeing Co., 644 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir.
2011)).
164. See United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1238 (9th Cir. 2005) (“It
has become de rigueur to criticize CERCLA as a hastily passed statute that is far from a
paragon of legislative clarity.”); Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 883 (“Clearly, neither a logician
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result of last minute revisions and concessions, which were made on the
House and Senate floors.165 In the end, the final draft bore almost no
resemblance to previous versions of the bill.166 Despite this problem,
most courts still acknowledge the fundamental intentions of the law: (1)
provide a prompt and effective response to environmental calamities;
and (2) shift the burden of cleanup costs to the responsible parties.167
The Tribes stressed CERCLA’s broad and remedial purpose in
framing their argument, but the Ninth Circuit found this contention
insipid.168 While some courts are willing to interpret CERCLA’s
provisions liberally, the Ninth Circuit has been historically reluctant to
follow this model.169 It would seem that more concrete legislative
history—beyond conclusory platitudes—is necessary to impart an
expansion of CERCLA liability in this jurisdiction.170
Although CERCLA’s direct legislative history is sparse,
foundational elements of the law can be found in House and Senate bills
that were never passed.171 Some of these bills were incorporated into
CERCLA’s final draft, for example Senate bill 1480,172 which
introduced many of the cleanup and financing provisions that are
synonymous with CERCLA today.173 The legislative history of this bill

nor a grammarian will find comfort in the world of CERCLA. . . . Transported to
Washington, D.C. in 1980 or 1986, armed with a red pen and a copy of Strunk & White’s
Elements of Style, we might offer a few clarifying suggestions.”).
165. TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 73; see also United States v. Conservation Chem. Co.,
619 F. Supp. 162, 204 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (“[A] hastily assembled bill and a fragmented
legislative history add to the usual difficulty of discerning the full meaning of the law.”). The
compromised law was passed under a suspension of the rules that prohibited subsequent
amendments. TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 73. Consequently, “there are no committee or
conference reports addressing the version of the legislation that ultimately became law.” Id. at
4.
166. Compare Hazardous Waste Contamination Act of 1980, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong.
(1980), with The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat., 2767 (1980).
167. TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 73; see, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
United States, 556 U.S. 599, 599 (2009).
168. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985.
169. See, e.g., Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (finding that CERCLA’s definition of disposal does not encompass the passive
migration of contaminates through the soil). But see Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,
452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that Teck Cominco “arranged for disposal” even
though it did not contract with a third-party).
170. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 985.
171. SWITZER & GRAY, supra note 71, at 5–8.
172. See Environmental Emergency Response Act, S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1979).
173. See SWITZER & GRAY, supra note 71, at 5–8.
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has been helpful in discerning the drafters’ intent for some of
CERCLA’s more intricate issues.174
1. History of the El Paso Smelter
Within the legislative history for Senate bill 1480 is a report from
the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee, which
delineates some of the underlying congressional concerns that led to the
bill’s creation.175 The Committee Report references a research study that
examined six cases of environmental contamination.176 The study,
conducted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), concluded that
victims in these six cases were undercompensated for their injuries—in
part, due to the lack of legal remedies available.177
One of the cases examined in the CRS Report involved a smelter in
El Paso, Texas.178 The smelter operator employed a significant number
of migrant workers, some of whom lived in a nearby community that
was colloquially called “Smeltertown.”179
It was a squalid
neighborhood; it lacked running water, electricity, and basic social

174. See, e.g., Ninth Ave. Remedial Grp. v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651, 664
(N.D. Ind. 1996) (finding that the legislative history of S. 1480 supported the argument that
CERCLA was intended to be applied retroactively).
175. S. REP. NO. 96-848 (1980).
176. Id. at 13–14.
177. Id. The CRS Report reached three basic conclusions: (1) the common law is
generally not conducive to prevailing on toxic tort claims; (2) proving injuries from pollution
and contamination is difficult and expensive; and, consequently, (3) the compensation
afforded to victims is incommensurate with their damages. Id.; see CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
SER. NO. 93-13, SIX CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES POLLUTION:
ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY, AND TEXAS, (1980)
[hereinafter SIX CASE STUDIES].
178. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 51. Founded in 1887, the smelter
specialized in copper, lead, and zinc. Id. at 51. In 2008, the smelter operator ASARCO
entered into a landmark bankruptcy settlement, which required it to pay fifty-two million in
cleanup costs pursuant to its liabilities under CERCLA and RCRA. In re ASARCO LLC, No.
05-21207, 2009 WL 8176865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 21, 2009). The contamination from the
El Paso smelter presents an analogous transboundary pollution issue to the Trail Smelter
problem. See infra Section III.B.2; John Burnett, A Toxic Century: Mining Giant Must Clean
Up Mess, NPR (Feb. 4, 2010, 12:50 AM) https://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=122779177 (“It is very clear that a majority of what came out of that flue
and was deposited over 100 years landed in Mexico.”); El Paso Smelter Still Poses LeadPoisoning Peril to Children in Juarez, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 1977), http://www.nytimes.com/
1977/11/28/archives/el-paso-smelter-still-poses-leadpoisoning-peril-to-children-in.html
(Mexican health authorities concluded that approximately 8000 children, living within a halfmile of the El Paso smelter, were suffering the effects of lead pollution).
179. The community housed roughly 120 Chicano families. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra
note 177, at 51.
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services.180 Situated in the smelter’s shadow, residents would watch as
toxic slag poured into a molten pile right beside their homes.181
Many children living in Smeltertown were found to have elevated
levels of lead in their blood.182 In 1972, thirty-five children were
hospitalized due to lead poisoning.183 Shortly thereafter, health officials
evicted Smeltertown’s residents and relocated the families across the
city.184 Environmental investigations found disturbing levels of toxic
metals throughout the area.185 Given the scope and scale of the
dispersion, investigators agreed that the smelter’s emissions were the
primary source of the contamination.186
Despite knowledge of the contamination, ASARCO, the smelter
operator, did not warn residents in Smeltertown.187 Consequently, for
more than seven years, ASARCO silently observed as residents inhaled
and ingested toxic levels of lead on a daily basis.188 In 1972, the city of
El Paso brought a lawsuit against the smelter operator under state
environmental laws.189 The parties settled and ASARCO agreed to
implement new pollution control measures over a period of several
years.190 Many of the private lawsuits that followed also settled but, due
to evidentiary difficulties, most parties were undercompensated for their
damages.191

180. See SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 406 (describing the town as
“substandard housing, dusty unpaved roads, chipped and peeling paint; in close proximity to a
major highway”).
181. Id.
182. Philip J. Landrigan et al., Epidemic Lead Absorption Near an Ore Smelter: The
Role of Particulate Lead, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 123, 128–29 (1975). Among children
studied, roughly forty-three percent had abnormal lead absorption levels; environmental
particulate lead was determined to be the leading cause of exposure. Id. “[T]he more mobile
fractions of environmental particulate lead—that is, the lead in dust and air—were those most
closely associated with human uptake.” Id. Although there are recognized thresholds for
determining a potentially toxic level of lead, most researchers agree there is no safe level for
lead. Kate J. Darby, Lead Astray: Scale, Environmental Justice and the El Paso Smelter, 17
LOC. ENVTL. 797, 798–99 (2012).
183. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 406.
184. Id. at 51. Prior to the relocation of the Smeltertown families, ASARCO sprayed
plastic chemicals on the ground to keep dust levels down. Id. at 418.
185. Landrigan et al., supra note 182, at 123–25.
186. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 417–18; Landrigan, supra note 182, at 129.
187. ASARCO did warn local ranchers, however, that the area was unsafe for cattle
grazing. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 417–18.
188. Id. at 420–22.
189. Id. at 422–24.
190. Id.
191. Texas law requires “more than a suspicion that such health effects will occur.” Id.
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2. The El Paso Smelter is Part of CERCLA’s Past and Present
While it is unclear how influential this report was in the final
version of CERCLA, its existence alone contradicts the Pakootas court’s
contention that “Congress did not appear to consider a fact pattern like
this one.”192 The similarities are uncanny, even to the point that the CRS
Report references the Trail Smelter during its discussion of the El Paso
incident.193 Moreover, the focus of the CRS Report was on the smelter’s
emissions.194 Although there was some discussion that hazardous waste
was released from the smelter’s facility though other pathways, the
particulate matter primarily escaped in the form of emissions.195
Therefore, if we infer from the CRS Report that Congress intended to
address environmental disasters like Smeltertown, then it is reasonable to
conclude that the legislative history supports the argument that aerial
deposition of particulate matter was intended to constitute disposal under

at 449. Most diseases have multiple causes; therefore, the latent health risks associated with
lead poisoning typically are established through epidemiological studies. See CARL F.
CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 38 (2006). To this
end, litigants can show that compared to the general population, the individuals in the exposed
cohort were at an elevated risk for the chronic conditions attributed to lead poisoning. See id.
However, there are pragmatic difficulties in obtaining helpful epidemiological studies. Id. at
155–56; see also Cancer Clusters: The Hunt for a Killer, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2017, 9:57
AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/cancer-clusters-the-hunt-for-a-killer/ [https://perma.cc/
X3HN-5FGT] (noting that the occurrence of rare cancers in an isolated geographic area (i.e.
“cancer clusters”) often times cannot be directly linked to any environmental contamination).
192. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 985 (9th Cir. 2016). It
should be acknowledged that Senate bill 1480 originally contained a personal injury provision,
which was not included in the final version of the law. See Grad, supra note 70, at 19. It
could be argued that the CRS report was directly aimed at supporting this omitted provision
and, thus, it should be given less legal weight. See SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ix
(Helen Cohn Needham & Mark Menefee, eds., 1982) (“[E]xplanations of a bill that did not
pass the Congress are generally less important than explanations of a bill that did pass.”). But
cf. 126 CONG. REC. 30,943 (1980) (statement of Rep. Heinz) (arguing that the El Paso Smelter
incident was, in part, the basis for imposing a fee on zinc smelters).
[The] EPA document, ‘Fees on Zinc’ . . . has been cited as justification for
imposing Superfund fees on zinc. . . . [I]ncriminating zinc in connection with the
El Paso smelter is intentionally misleading. It has never been suggested that zinc
emissions from that smelter have caused any adverse human health effects and the
effects which were noted have been subsequently discredited by reputable
scientists. In addition, the smelting of zinc has not been shown to cause the
release of hazardous quantities of other pollutants.
Id.
193. SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 177, at 449 (“Similar damage to cattle and horses
was reported near a lead smelter in Trail, British Columbia.”).
194. Id. at 407.
195. Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 7 (1980) (discussing environmental disasters
that precipitate the drafting of S. 1480) (“The careless manufacturing and disposal practices
also resulted in atmospheric emissions which settled on surface soils.”).
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CERCLA.
Unsurprisingly, despite “onerous” environmental regulations, the El
Paso Smelter continued to pollute the surrounding area for many more
years.196 Finally, in July of 2002, the EPA sent a Notice of Potential
Liability to ASARCO, which informed the company that it was
potentially liable under CERCLA for numerous contaminated sites
throughout the city.197 While initial negotiations were unproductive,
ASARCO eventually agreed to pay more than fifty million dollars in
cleanup costs.198 However, since its liability under CERCLA and RCRA
was largely predicated on the aerial deposition of particulate matter, a
similar settlement agreement might have been unlikely had the
contamination occurred in the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.199
Accordingly, not only is the El Paso Smelter case indicative of the issues
that CERCLA was intended to address, it also demonstrates CERCLA’s
effectiveness when the law is broadly applied.
C. EPA Decisions Should Be Given Skidmore Deference
In a letter of supplemental authority, the United States argued to the
Pakootas court that the EPA “has for decades used CERCLA to respond
to contamination from the aerial deposition of hazardous substances.”200
The plaintiffs posited that these administrative documents might be
entitled to Skidmore deference.201 The Ninth Circuit declined to address
196. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, EL PASO AND DONA ANA COUNTY METALS
SURVEY SAMPLING REPORT (Aug. 17, 2001), https://d32ogoqmya1dw8.cloudfront.net/files/
integrate/teaching_materials/map_sense/el_paso_dona_ana.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MMZ9D2A]. The report prepared for the EPA found elevated levels of arsenic and lead in locations
throughout El Paso, including parks, schools, and college campuses. Id. The report also
found levels of arsenic and lead more than two orders of magnitude greater than permitted
threshold levels. Letter from Myron O. Knudson, P.E., Dir. Superfund Div., to ASARCO Inc.
(Jul. 16, 2002) (on file with EPA).
197. Knudson, supra note 196.
198. In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2009 WL 8176865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July
21, 2009).
199. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2016). If
ASARCO had wanted to challenge the EPA’s determination that it was a PRP, its strongest
argument would be a definitional defense based on whether it “disposed” of any hazardous
waste. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2016).
200. Letter of Supplemental Authority at 1, Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.,
830 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016) (No. 15-35228). See, e.g., In re Gulf Res. & Chem. Corp. &
Hecla Mining Co., EPA1090-10-01-106, 1990 WL 10532643, at *1 (E.P.A. Oct. 1, 1990).
201. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 220 (2001) (“Chevron did not
eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference
whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and
information’ available to the agency.”) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139
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this argument in its opinion because the issue was not fully briefed
during oral argument.202 However, assuming future litigants present this
argument in a timely manner, courts should be receptive to its merits.
The EPA has been responsible for administering and enforcing
CERCLA since the law was enacted.203 This familiarity with the
intricacies and practicalities of the law should warrant some deference
from the courts.204 The Supreme Court first articulated this concept in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., which addressed whether an agency’s
interpretation of a provision within the Fair Labor Standards Act should
warrant any consideration from the courts.205 The Court found that
based on the agency’s “body of experience and informed judgment,” its
opinions, while not controlling, were a proper source of guidance.206
Since Skidmore was decided, courts have deferred to agency
determinations promulgated in letters, settlement agreements, unilateral
orders, and various other legal memoranda.207 It is worth noting,
however, that Skidmore deference is only persuasive and, unlike
Chevron deference (normally afforded to agency promulgated
regulations),208 does not require the court to deviate from prior judicial
interpretation.209
Therefore, when it comes to the issue of defining “disposal” under
CERCLA, courts should be willing to consider the EPA’s historical

(1944)).
202. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 986 n.12 (“Arguments raised for the first time in 28(j)
letters are ordinarily considered waived. . . . We decline to reach such a complex issue on less
than full briefing.”).
203. See generally Executive Order No. 12580, 52 Fed. Reg. 2921, FR 2923 (Jan. 23,
1987).
204. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 218; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
205. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
206. See id.
207. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 235–39 (finding that a “ruling letter” regarding a
customs classification was due deference dependent on its “thoroughness, logic and
expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight”); Alaska Oil &
Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2016) (affording Skidmore deference to
an internal memoranda regarding the endangered species list), cert. denied, No. 17-133, 2018
WL 491542, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2018); Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, L.L.C., 799
F.3d 468, 479 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted in part sub nom. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity
Brands, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016) (“Copyright Office’s determination that design is
protectable under the Copyright Act is entitled to Skidmore deference.”); cf. Siwe v. Holder,
742 F.3d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 2014) (reviewing one-member Board of Immigration (BIA)
decisions under the Skidmore deference standard).
208. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66
(1984). Neither side in Pakootas argued that Chevron deference applied. Pakootas v. Teck
Cominco Metals, Ltd., 830 F.3d 975, 986 n.12 (9th Cir. 2016).
209. Pakootas, 830 F.3d at 986.
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application of the law.210 For example, the EPA’s letter to ASARCO
stated that the company was a PRP under CERCLA, impliedly because it
emitted hazardous waste, which was subsequently deposited throughout
the city.211 However, this is far from the only example of the EPA
applying CERCLA in cases that involved emissions of hazardous
waste.212
In a letter of supplemental authority, counsel for the United States
cited three instances where the EPA had determined that emissions were
a form of disposal under CERCLA.213 For example, In re Gulf
Resources, years of mining and smelting had caused significant
contamination in the Silver Valley of Idaho.214 The location was placed
on the NPL and identified as the Bunker Hill Mining and Metallurgical
Site.215 The respondent companies entered an agreement with the EPA
to initiate remedial action in the area.216 The agreement specifically
stated that the “respondents and their predecessors in interest have
released large quantities of a variety of waste products, including
airborne emissions.”217 Other cases include In re ACM Smelter &
Refinery Site218 and In re Anniston Lead Site, & Anniston PCB Site.219 In
both locations, the EPA concluded that aerial deposition of hazardous
waste was a significant contamination pathway, and that CERCLA
liability could be imposed on the respondents based on this activity.220
210. See Letter of Supplemental Authority, supra note 200; Oral Argument, supra note
126, at 22:05–22:16 (“There have been thirty years of CERCLA practice of addressing smelter
sites, refineries . . . hundreds of sites across the country where allegations are based on the
aerial deposition of hazardous substance.”).
211. Knudson, supra note 196.
212. See, e.g., In re Gulf Res. & Chem. Corp. & Hecla Mining Co., No.1090-10-01106, 1990 WL 10532643, at *1 (E.P.A. Oct. 1, 1990).
213. Letter of Supplemental Authority, supra note 200.
214. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REGION 10, MINE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR
THE BUNKER HILL MINE KELLOGG, IDAHO, 2-1–2-2 (1999), https://www3.epa.gov/region10/
pdf/sites/bunker_hill/cda_basin/bunker_hill_mine_contigency_plan.pdf.
215. Id.
216. See generally In re Gulf Res., 1990 WL 10532643, at *7.
217. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
218. CERCLA-04-2005-3777, (E.P.A. Jul. 27, 2005), https://www.epa.gov/sites/
production/files/2014-03/documents/anniston_pcb_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYY5-XKWD].
219. CERCLA-08-2011-0017, (E.P.A. Sept. 8, 2011), http://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/
RHC/EPAAdmin.nsf/Filings/734256DA6DAC2D5385257907001B7F19/$File/CERCLA0820
110017%20AO.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EUG-LWHT].
220. In re Anniston Lead Site, & Anniston PCB Site, CERCLA-08-2011-0017, (E.P.A.
Sept.
8,
2011),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-03/documents/
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Given the breadth and thoroughness of these administrative orders,
courts should be willing to defer to the EPA’s interpretation of
disposal.221 While this deference might not be dispositive, it is important
that courts at least consider the EPA’s opinions.222 Although any
decision must be sound in legal precedent, pragmatism should have its
day in court as well.
CONCLUSION
The recent Ninth Circuit holding in Pakootas dramatically curtails
the scope of CERCLA liability. It is a ruling that is inconsistent with
CERCLA’s broad remedial purpose, legislative history, administrative
enforcement, and interpretation. The court erroneously concluded that it
was bound by prior precedent because it failed to consider the factual
context of BNSF and the distinguishable issues that the Pakootas case
presented. Future litigants in other jurisdictions should be swift to argue
that the aerial deposition of hazardous waste fits squarely within the
definition of disposal under CERCLA. Otherwise, polluters like Teck
Cominco will continue to escape responsibility for their environmental
contamination through linguistic contortion.

anniston_pcb_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/UYY5-XKWD] (“Millions of pounds of PCBs were
released from the plant through disposal of . . . [polychlorinated biphenyl] through air and
fugitive emissions.”); In re ACM Smelter & Refinery Site, CERCLA-04-2005-3777, (E.P.A.
Jul.
27,
2005),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/RHC/EPAAdmin.nsf/Filings/
734256DA6DAC2D5385257907001B7F19/$File/CERCLA0820110017%20AO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7EUG-LWHT] (“Contaminant transport to the community of Black Eagle
occurred via several pathways, including primarily airborne particulate contamination from
the smelter stack, which settled on neighborhood soils, buildings and other surfaces.”).
221. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(“The majority’s approach . . . sets forth a sliding scale of deference . . . dependent ‘upon the
thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
222. See Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding the
EPA’s characterization of a CERCLA action as either removal or remedial under CERCLA
was entitled to Skidmore deference).

